COMMENTS

Derivative Actions by Policyholders
on Behalf of Mutual Insurance Companies
Theodore Allegaertt

During the years 1990 through 1993, several of the largest
domestic mutual insurance companies engaged in deceptive
marketing and sales practices in their efforts to increase sales of
their life insurance products. They sought to tap the mutual fund
and savings bank markets by inducing individuals in specifically
identified occupations who were likely to possess investment
capital, but not investment acumen, to buy life insurance policies
as "investment" or "retirement" plans.' In doing so, agents styled
themselves investment specialists, assiduously avoided using the
word "insurance," and reaped a bonanza in commissions.2 Such
misleading sales practices, however, were patently in violation of
state consumer protection laws and insurance disclosure rules
imposed by state insurance regulators.'

t BAL 1987, Columbia University; J.D. Candidate 1996, The University of Chicago.
' See Michael Quint, New Refunds for Misled MetLife Customers, NY Times D1, D1
(Dec 28, 1993) (discussing the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's involvement in
such practices); Suzanne Woolley and Gail DeGeorge, Policies of Deception?Investigations
of Misleading Sales Tactics Rock the Insurance Industry, Bus Week 24, 24-25 (Jan 17,
1994) ("Insurance agents [are] competing with banks, mutual funds and others.").
2 See Greg Steinmetz, Florida Widens Insurance-Sales Probe To New York Life,
Possibly Prudential,Wal St J A3, A3 (Dec 29, 1993). These commissions can be up to
twenty-seven times higher for whole life insurance policies than for more investment-like
products such as annuity contracts. See Woolley and DeGeorge, Policies ofDeception?, Bus
Week at 24-25 (cited in note 1).
' Steinmetz, Florida Widens Insurance-SalesProbe,Wal St J at A3 (cited in note 2);
Greg Steinmetz, Met Life Got Caught; Others Sent Same Letter, Wall St J B1, B1 (Jan 6,
1994).
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When these practices came to light in 1993, state investigators believed that a small number of rogue agents at the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's regional office in Tampa,
Florida were responsible. During the ensuing months, however, a
widespread scandal rocked the insurance industry, as investigators discovered that several of the largest insurers had engaged
in similar misleading practices.4 Investigations in at least twenty-eight states, sizable fines, and numerous dismissals of regional
managers followed.5 The companies involved initially sought to
contain the damage by claiming that upper-level management
was unaware of any illegal conduct. The evidence, however,
belied such claims.6 Regulators determined that upper-level
managers bore responsibility for the illegal practices, primarily
for their failures to control and monitor their sales forces.!
Among the many issues raised by the scandal, the question
stands out: What checks effectively constrain the management of
mutual insurance companies? More specifically, should administrative regulation by state insurance departments be the sole
check on mutual insurance company managers, or may policyholders act as private attorneys general and sue derivatively to
redress breaches of duty by management?
This Comment examines whether, and on what legal basis,
policyholders in mutual insurance companies have standing to
bring derivative claims8 to enforce management duties and compel the proper use of corporate assets.' The issue of policyholder

' See Woolley and DeGeorge, Policies ofDeception?, Bus Week at 24 (cited in note 1)
("From a seemingly isolated incident in Florida, the MetLife scandal just keeps getting
bigger."); Prudential in Talks on Accusations Some Customers Were Misled, NY Times
Section 1 at 36 (Feb 17, 1996) (reporting that Prudential brokers were accused of luring
customers into replacing existing policies at an added cost, a practice known as churning).
See Prudentialin Talks, NY Times Section 1 at 36 (cited in note 4).
6 See Woolley and DeGeorge, Policies of Deception?, Bus Week at 25 (cited in note 1).
7 Id at 24-25.
8 A derivative action aims to make the damaged company whole after managements
breach of duty causes loss, irrespective of whether state regulators take action in response
to the breach. Derivative litigation provides an alternative to state administrative regulation but, as will be discussed, is not without drawbacks.
' A policyholder derivative action is functionally equivalent to the traditional stockholder derivative action: in each case, the plaintiff sues in the company's name to compel
an accounting for losses resulting from director misconduct. The stockholder derivative
action has traditionally been available whenever the company itself has refused to bring
suit, particularly when the board is controlled by the directors who would be defendants
in such a suit. Thus, derivative actions are distinct from direct actions against the company or its directors. See, for example, Koster v (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Co., 330 US 518, 522 (1947) ("Equity therefore traditionally entertains the derivative or
secondary action by which a single stockholder may sue in the corporation's right when he
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standing is important both because mutual insurance companies
manage great volumes of assets and because state regulation in
its current form may not adequately protect policyholders from
managerial wrongdoing.
The question of policyholder derivative standing first arose in
the late nineteenth century. Since then, a judge-made rule in favor of standing has evolved in several jurisdictions. Although
several cases support policyholder standing as a matter of common law right, statutory changes have complicated the issue.
Specifically, a majority of states have enacted laws providing for
derivative actions by "shareholders"'0 without indicating whether mutual insurance policyholders fall within the meaning of the
term. In addition, New York-where a number of the largest
mutual companies are chartered" and where much of the early
case law supporting policyholder standing developed-appears to
have enacted a statutory bar to policyholder derivative actions.'
However, because no court has ever cited, much less examined,
the New York statute in a reported case, the prohibition remains
untested.
Section I of this Comment briefly explains mutual insurance
and its underlying legal framework. It focuses first on the duties
that mutual companies and their managers owe to policyholders,
and then on the authority of state regulators to oversee the
insurance industry. Section II examines state and federal cases
in which policyholders have sued derivatively, summarizes the
statutory law governing derivative actions generally, and discusses derivative actions by nonstockholder plaintiffs in other contexts. Section II demonstrates that a combination of legislative
inattention and a failure on the part of the judiciary to confront
standing issues unique to mutual insurance derivative suits'3
shows that [it] ...has refused to pursue a remedy.").
10 See Deborah A. DeMott, ShareholderDerivative Actions Law & Practice§ 4:02 at
9-30 (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1987 & Supp 1995) (citing state statutes). Although
Professor DeMott's practice manual is the authoritative guide to derivative actions, she
does not address the issue of mutual policyholder standing in the current edition.
" See Bests Insurance Reports: Life-Health 638, 1306, 1505 (Best 77th ed 1982)
("Bests Reports") (Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Equitable Life Assurance Society
of the United States, and New York Mutual Life Insurance Company-the second, third,
and sixth largest mutual companies, respectively-are organized under the laws of New
York. Each does business in the fifty states and Canada.).
1 NY Ins Law §§ 108(a), 108(d) (McKinney 1985 & Supp 1996) (providing that while
the New York Business Corporation Law generally applies to insurance companies,
certain articles and sections-including § 626, which provides for shareholder derivative
suits, see NY Bus Corp Law § 626 (McKinney 1986 & Supp 1996)-shall not apply to
mutual insurance companies).
"3 These issues include the policyholders' attenuated ownership interest in their
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has led to an unsatisfactory legal framework, in which courts in
most jurisdictions may plausibly decide the issue either way.
This is problematic because the current case law-which generally assumes standing without discussion and so does not resolve
the issue-may encourage parties to settle for strike-suit'4 money rather than risk litigating the standing issue."5 As in the
stock corporation context, such collusive settlements nullify the
salutary effects of derivative litigation.
Finally, Section III argues that while the issue of policyholder standing is closer than the cases indicate, courts should allow
policyholder derivative suits to proceed, subject to certain limitations. Judicial and legislative decision makers should apply some,
but not all, of the procedural safeguards against vexatious derivative claims that have evolved in the stock corporation context. 6
These strictures should be made expressly applicable to policyholder suits, mutatis mutandis, whether by statute, rules of
procedure, or judge-made court rules. Although the ideal solution
may be legislative reform, until legislatures expressly provide for
policyholder derivative standing, judges should add clarity to this
area of the law by squarely confronting the differences between
stockholder and policyholder actions when the latter arise. By
analyzing mutual insurance companies' ownership structure,
inquiring whether the policyholder's ownership interest necessar-

company, a lack of statutory provisions for policyholder suits, a lack of statutory protection from policyholder strike suits, and the level of state regulation of the insurance

industry.
" A strike suit is a derivative action brought with a view to winning a private settlement (consisting mostly or entirely of attorneys' fees) that does not intend to benefit the
company on whose behalf the suit is brought.
" Practical considerations may explain the paucity of case law addressing the standing issue in the mutual insurance context. The actual litigants, plaintiffs' lawyers on one
side and director and officer insurance carriers (D & 0 carriers") on the other, have not
pressed judges to decide the issue because both benefit from the uncertainty. Plaintiffs'
lawyers certainly will not make an issue of it. It is, moreover, unlikely that any defendant
will litigate the standing issue vigorously in a jurisdiction where the question is unsettled:
If a defendant (represented by his D & 0 carrier) presses the issue and prevails, he wins
the instant case, but risks a legislative response-perhaps in the wake of a well publicized
dismissal on standing grounds of a meritorious case-giving policyholders standing by
statute. This would haunt defendant D & 0 carriers in the form of higher settlement
payouts, because the credibility of the next plaintiff's threat to go trial would be greatly
enhanced. If, on the other hand, a defendant presses the issue and loses, the ambiguity-which previously worked in its favor in settlement discussions-would be lost and
policyholder standing would be enshrined in a published case report. See DeMott, Shareholder Derivative Actions § 7:05 at 27-28 (cited in note 10) (conflicts among plaintiffs and
their attorneys).
"6 Such strictures include, among others, those enumerated in FROP 23.1. See text
accompanying notes 133-39.
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fly confers a right to sue derivatively, and examining the level
and effectiveness of state insurance regulation, courts can effectively define the proper scope of policyholder derivative standing.
I. THE FUNCTION AND REGULATION OF
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANIES

A. Function
Understanding the relationship between mutual insurance
policyholders and their companies is essential to resolving the

question of whether policyholders have standing to sue
derivatively. Mutual insurance companies are organized, maintained, and operated solely for the benefit of their policyholders,
who are insured individually while acting collectively as insurers.' 7 Such companies do not generate traditional entrepreneur-

ial profits,"s but rather seek to meet their obligations at the lowest possible cost to the policyholders who, by paying premiums,
provide the companies' exclusive source of capital. Any surplus

beyond a reasonable reserve is distributed periodically among the
policyholders as "dividends," usually in the form of a downward
adjustment of future premiums. 9 This mode of operation is intrinsically different from that of stock corporations (including
stock insurers),20 not-for-profit corporations,2 ' and limited partnerships. Mutual companies are not dissimilar to cooperatives,
" See, for example, PennsylvaniaMutual Life Insurance Co. v Lederer, 252 US 523,
533 (1920) ("[Mutual life insurance companies ... perform[ ] the service called insuring
wholly for the benefit of their policyholders."); NY Ins Law § 1211 (McKinney 1985 &
Supp 1996) ("Every domestic mutual insurance corporation shall be organized, maintained
and operated for the benefits of its members as a non-stock corporation.").
18 See Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 42 Misc 2d
616, 248 NYS2d 559, 566 (NY Sup Ct 1963) ("[A] mutual company... functions to provide
insurance at cost rather than to amass profits in the ordinary business sense.").
19 Id.

o Stock insurers, like other stock corporations, actively seek to generate profits for
their shareholders and do not rebate surplus to policyholders. Robert E. Keeton and Alan
I. Widiss, Insurance Law: A Guide to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines, and
CommercialPractices § 2.1 at 33 (West 1988).
1 Not-for-profit corporations are necessarily barred from distributing profits or
surplus to members. See, for example, Colo Rev Stat Ann § 7-24-110 (West 1990 & Supp
1995); Iowa Code Ann § 504A.26 (West 1991 & Supp 1995); RI Gen Laws § 7-6-31 (Michie
1992 & Supp 1995). Moreover, membership in certain not-for-profit corporations may not
involve the right to vote. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit CorporationLaw,
129 U Pa L Rev 497, 503 (1981) (noting that some nonprofit organizations are not controlled by their patrons). Policyholders generally have a right to vote in the management
of mutual insurance companies. See note 23.
See, for example, Lubin v Equitable Life Assurance Society, 326 Ill App 358, 61
NE2d 753, 757 (1945) ("It has been uniformly and repeatedly held that a mutual life
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which provide goods or services to members at cost and give each
member substantially equal control."
The relationship between mutual insurance policyholders
and their company defies easy classification because the policyholders are both the equitable owners of the company and, at the
same time, akin to creditors of the company. This relationship
differs from that between a stockholder and his corporation in
important ways. Because "dividends" in the mutual insurance
context represent an adjustment of policy premiums rather than
a return on equity,24 the policyholder has little interest in the
continued growth and prosperity of the enterprise beyond assurance of the company's ability to meet its contractual obligations
to him. This relationship has been likened to that of debtor and
creditor, where the buyer has merely prepaid for the service he
seeks from the vendor.2 By this view, the policyholders are not
"owners" who can be relied on to use derivative suits to safeguard
the ongoing prosperity of the company. Rather, they are creditors
whose interests extend no further than the receipt of a contractually determined payout (usually following some misfortune) or a
contractually determined refund if the company elects to rebate
yearly surplus or cancel the policies outright (as it may).26
The debtor-creditor analogy underscores the differences between policyholders and stockholders as they relate to questions
of derivative standing. If a court views policyholders as more like
creditors than owners, it should apply the traditional rule barring derivative actions by creditors on behalf of solvent companies.2 This rule assumes that creditors will be unduly skeptical
insurance company does not partake of the nature of a partnership.").
2

See generally Israel Packel, The Organization and Operation of Cooperatives 2-3

(ALI 1970). See also J.A.C. Hetherington, Fact v. Fiction: Who Owns Mutual Insurance
Companies, 1969 Wis L Rev 1068, 1080 (MThe general rule is that each policyholder [in a
mutual insurance company] has one vote regardless of the number of policies held and
regardless of its or their value."). Professor Hetherington differentiates cooperatives from
mutual insurers, however, by noting that the "strong tradition of participation among
members [of some cooperatives]" is not shared by mutual insurance policyholders. Id at
1083 n 56.
24 See, for example, Kern v John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 8 AD2d 256,
186 NYS2d 992, 996 (1959) ("While the annual return to the policyholder... is generally
called a 'dividend', it is not analogous to the distribution of profits to stockholders of a

profit-making organization.").
' See Hetherington, 1969 Wis L Rev at 1072 (cited in note 23) ("As a buyer who paid
in advance, the policyholder is a imancing buyer,' a creditor of the insurer.").
2 See id at 1076 ('The fact that policyholders in a mutual insurance company... may be 'fired' by the management who are theoretically their employees, is strongly indicative of the nonproprietary character of their relationship to the company.").
27 See, for example, ALI, 2 Principlesof Corporate Governance:Analysis and Recom-
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(relative to investors) of normal business risks because they care
only that their debtors remain able to pay. That is, policyholders,
like simple creditors, arguably are not interested in the growth or
other benefits that management expects to realize when it incurs
added risks. By this view, policyholders will be more inclined to
bring vexatious derivative actions alleging that management
decisions are "harming" the company." Although the problem of
characterizing the policyholders' relationship to their company is
pivotal in mutual insurance cases, it has yet to be squarely addressed in a judicial opinion resolving a policyholder action.29
Thus the applicability of the rule against creditor suits to policyholders is uncertain.
B. Regulation
Insurers differ from other private corporations in the level
and intrusiveness of the regulation to which each is subject.
States regulate insurance more than almost any other industry,
due in part to a near total absence of federal insurance regulation.3" All states have insurance departments31 charged with
supervising and regulating the insurers chartered and doing
business in their respective states. The departments are headed
by insurance commissioners 2 who generally have broad statutory authority to redress illegal activity by insurers and insurance
agents. Commissioners may impose fines, issue injunctions, remove managers, and, in egregious cases, revoke an offending
company's license to conduct business." In the case of insolvent
or recalcitrant insurers, commissioners generally have broad and

mendations § 7.02(a) at 33-34 & comment c at 35-36 (1994).
' Id (-Ms... rule [prohibiting creditor derivative suits against solvent corpora-

tions] protects corporate officials from exposure to litigation brought by creditors who
would rationally have a... more skeptical attitude toward business risks than shareholders, and it is also justified by the greater availability to creditors of contractual mech-

anisms by which to... enforce their rights.").
See text accompanying notes 56-75.
See Keeton and Widiss, InsuranceLaw § 8.4(a)(3) at 958-61 (cited in note 20) (noting that the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 exempted the insurance industry from
federal regulation and antitrust laws, except in cases of boycotts or restraints of trade).
", See Bests Reports at vi (cited in note 11) (listing officials in charge of insurance affairs in all states).
' Various states give these officials the title of commissioner, superintendent, or director of insurance. Id. Since their professional association is styled the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC"), this Comment generally uses "commissioner" to describe all such officials.
I See generally Werner Pfennigstorf, The Enforcement of InsuranceLaws, 1969 Wis
L Rev 1026.
29

30
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exclusive powers of rehabilitation, including the authority to
assume control as statutory receiver.' Fines and restitution,
however, appear to be the tools of choice for many insurance commissioners. 5
In the wake of illegal conduct, large fines assessed by multiple states, 6 coupled with a loss of business from attendant bad
press, may substantially weaken an insurance company. In the
case of a mutual insurer, the policyholders, who effectively own
the company, must bear such losses. Where losses are caused by
a breach of duty on the part of the management, policyholder
standing is the first issue an inquiring plaintiff's lawyer will
need to address. Whether policyholders may sue corporate directors and officers derivatively on behalf of a damaged, but not
insolvent, insurer will be of considerable moment to the directors
and officers of mutual companies, their liability insurance carriers, the policyholders, and, of course, the plaintiffs' bar.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Introduction
Policyholder derivative suits have proceeded on three bases:
common law precedent, statutes, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 (or state rules patterned on it). This Section addresses
each in turn, beginning with the common law precedents-the
most instructive of which predate the statutes and Rule 23.1.
While there is ample precedent for allowing policyholder
derivative actions to proceed, judicial opinions resolving such
actions have largely failed to consider the standing issue. This
fact, coupled with the advent of numerous laws giving a right of
action to "shareholders," renders the present legal framework for
policyholder suits unsatisfactory. In the thirty-odd states with
substantive provisions for stockholder derivative suits, a defendant may plausibly assert that the legislature has elected to
regulate derivative actions by statute, and has declined to extend
a derivative cause of action to policyholders.37 If they accepted

' See Keeton and Widiss, Insurance Law § 8.2(a) at 940 (cited in note 20) (listing
examples of statutes providing for rehabilitation of insurers). See also NY Ins Law § 7409
(McKinney 1985 & Supp 1996) (authorizing receiver to seize all of the insurer's assets).
' See Pfennigstorf, 1969 Wis L Rev at 1039-44 (cited in note 33) (discussing use of
fines).
' MetLife and others faced this situation in the recent scandals. See text accompanying notes 1-5.
" This assertion is strongest in states that have statutes giving derivative standing
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this argument, courts could reasonably construe such statutes
strictly and conclude that, given the extensive state regulation of
the industry,
these statutory provisions do not mean more than
38
say.
they
The case law, however, suggests the opposite result. Virtually all judicial opinions in insurance derivative actions after the
Supreme Court's 1947 decision in Koster v (American)
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.39 have merely assumed the
cause of action without explicitly addressing standing. Thus,
interested parties remain uncertain as to how a court will rule if
and when the standing issue is litigated.
The relationship between mutual insurance policyholders
and their company derives historically from statutes under which
mutual companies are chartered and from the contractual terms
of issued policies.4" Incident to membership in a mutual company, the policyholder acquires certain proprietary interests, yet
these interests are not fiduciary and certainly are not akin to
partnership. In addition, membership places the policyholders in
a creditor-like contractual relationship with the company.4 ' The
challenge in adjudicating a mutual insurance derivative action,
then, is to determine whether the proprietary interests should
eclipse the debtor-creditor elements of the relationship.

to nonstockholders other than policyholders. See, for example, NY Not-for-Profit Corp Law
§ 623(a) (McKinney 1970 & Supp 1996) (providing that any class of members, capital
certificate holders of record, or owners not of record of a not-for-profit corporation may
sue); Cal Corp Code §§ 5710, 7710 (West 1990 & Supp 1996) (providing that subject to
limitations, plaintiffs may sue public benefit corporations and mutual benefit corporations,
respectively, if they were members at the times of the disputed transactions).
' Clarifying language, if any, in state statutes does not mention policyholders specifically. See, for example, Va Code Ann § 13.1-603 (Michie 1993 & Supp 1995)
("'Shareholder'[as used in the Virginia Stock Corporation Act] means the person in whose
name the shares are registered in the records of the corporation [or] the beneficial owner
of shares... ."); Cal Corp Code § 800(a) (West 1990 & Supp 1996) ("As used in this
section, ... 'shareholder' includes a member of an unincorporated association.").
3 330 US 518 (1947). See text accompanying notes 67-75.
' See Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 42 Mise 2d
616, 248 NYS2d 559, 565-67 (NY Sup Ct 1963) (citing statutes and noting that statutes
define policyholders' rights to share in the proceeds and prescribe manner in which
mutual company must ascertain and distribute divisible surplus to policyholders). See
also Lubin v Equitable Life Assurance Society, 326 Ill App 358, 61 NE2d 753, 756 (1945)
("[T]he rights of [policyholders] all stem from their policies ... [which] constitute the
whole contract between the parties."), quoting Andrews v EquitableLife Assurance Society, 124 F2d 788, 789 (7th Cir 1941).
41 Fidelity& Casualty, 248 NYS2d at 565 (stating that "the policyholder acquires certain specified proprietary interests [in the company] but, apart from these, the relationship is not of a fiduciary nature [and] is essentially that of debtor and creditor measured
by the contractual terms of the policy").

1072

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[63:1063

B. Common Law Recognition of Policyholder Standing
The applicability of debtor-creditor analysis to the relationship is complicated by the trustee-like characteristics of certain
activities undertaken by the company, such as collecting premiums (which are generally prepaid) and managing company
funds.42 Recognizing these characteristics, equity courts began
to soften the application of the harsh debtor-creditor rule4 when
adjudicating certain policyholder actions. Courts still refused to
recognize a fiduciary duty in direct actions by policyholders (such
as suits seeking to recover on policies or suits in equity for an
accounting)," but began to ignore the rule in actions by policyholders on behalf of their company, such as to enjoin waste.45
1. Early cases.
Of approximately two dozen reported cases in which policyholders have sued derivatively,"' two early New York appellate
cases stand out for their trenchant, albeit incomplete, analyses of
mutual insurance issues that later opinions have avoided. Ironically, neither was a purely derivative suit by a mutual insurance
policyholder.
The first, Swan v Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association,4 7
was brought as a direct action (notwithstanding its derivative
character) against the insurer for an accounting in equity and to

42 See William M. Shernoff, Sanford M. Gage, and Harvey R. Levine, Insurance Bad

Faith Litigation § 1.05 at 1-18 to 1-20 (Matthew Bender 1996).
' The rule deeming the debtor-creditor relationship nonfiduciary was originally applied in the insurance context by the New York Court of Appeals in Uhlman v New York
Life Insurance Co., 109 NY 421, 17 NE 363 (1888). The Uhlman court held that the
policyholders of insurance companies could not sue the company directly and thereby
"place the company in the power of unscrupulous parties [who could] take advantage of it
for the purpose of endeavoring to levy contribution from it." Id at 368.
4 See, for example, Lubin v Equitable Life Assurance Society, 326 Ill App 358, 61
NE2d 753, 757-58 (1945) (noting that a mutual life insurance company is not like a
partnership).
' See Young v Equitable Life Assurance Society, 49 Misc 347, 99 NY 446, 456 (NY
Sup Ct 1906) (holding that as a certificate holder, plaintiff could compel corporation to collect assets from delinquent directors).
' Parties tend to settle derivative suits, so the number of reported cases is a poor reflection of the frequency of derivative complaints in either the corporate or insurance contexts. See Thomas M. Jones, An EmpiricalExamination of the Resolution of Shareholder
Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 BU L Rev 542, 544-45 (1980) (finding that plaintiffs obtained a settlement without a definitive judicial ruling in over 70 percent of 531
actions studied, and that in less than 1 percent of the cases did plaintiffs win a litigated
judgment).
47 155 NY 9, 49 NE 258 (1898).

1996]

Derivative Actions by Policyholders

1073

enjoin waste and diversion of corporate assets. The court held
that (then) Section 56 of the New York Insurance Law' precluded the plaintiff from maintaining the action and that such an
action could be brought only by the attorney general, if at all. In
its analysis, the Swan court underscored the differences between
stock and mutual companies, described mutual insurance companies as being "almost public in their nature," and defended the
prescribed remedy as being in keeping with the view that insurance companies should be "the especial objects of the care and
watchfulness of the state."49 Swan thus appears to be the only
opinion to consider explicitly the operative differences between a
policyholder and a stockholder and to assess the effect of state
regulation on the policyholder's right to sue to protect the company. Later opinions resolving policyholder actions have ignored
these important issues.
Young v Equitable Life Assurance Society" involved an action similar to Swan, but brought derivatively against Equitable's
directors and officers. In overruling a demurrer to the
policyholder's derivative complaint 5 ' alleging waste of corporate
assets and other management wrongdoing, the Young court emphasized the similarities between stockholders and policyholders.
Focusing on the plaintiff's rights as a policyholder, the court
stated:
It seems.., clear that, in a purely mutual company, the
whole body of policy holders.., have a quasi ownership in
all the assets of the corporation, and are, like stockholders of

At the time, Section 56 of the Insurance Law provided, in part, that: "(N]o order,
judgment or decree, providing for an accounting or enjoining, restraining, or interfering
with the prosecution of the business of any life or casualty insurance company... shall
be made or granted otherwise than upon the application of the attorney general, on his
own motion or after his approval of a request in writing of the superintendent of the
insurance department." See id at 261 (quoting the provision). Other jurisdictions later
enacted similar statutes. See Haynes v FraternalAid Union, 34 F2d 305, 306 (D Kan
1929) (noting that under 1927 Kan Sess Laws ch 231, § 40-713, insurance companies must
ask the attorney general to seek an injunction); Schwartz v Kemper, 69 F Supp 152, 153
(N D Ill 1946) (noting that under Ill Ann Stat ch 73, 1 813 (Smith-Hurd 1965), the attorney general must petition for injunction).
9 Swan, 49 NE at 261-62.
50 49 Mise 347, 99 NYS 446 (NY Sup Ct 1906), aff'd as Young v Hyde, 112 AD 760, 98
NYS 1052 (1906).
" The plaintiff policyholder was also a stockholder. Equitable, which is now a New
York-chartered mutual company, was then a stock corporation with its business "conducted upon the mutual plan." Young, 99 NYS at 447. This transitional phase preceded its full
mutualization in 1925, when the company retired the last of its capital stock. See Best's
Reports at 638 (cited in note 11).
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an ordinary corporation, in effect its cestui que trust. The
membership changes hourly. Old members go out and new
come in; but, unless all the policy holders at a given moment
in equity own the corporate property, then we have the extraordinary spectacle of a corporation, without members,
without stockholders, a legal fiction, an abstract idea, owning absolutely all corporate property, in trust for no one,
with responsibility to no one except creditors and then only
to pay debts. This conception of a legal fiction as an absolute
owner is not sound. Living persons must be the ultimate
owners of all corporate property. In a mutual insurance
company they can be none other than the policy holders.5 2
The court explained that the stockholder's right to sue
derivatively is not based upon the relationship-fiduciary or
otherwise-between stockholders and directors.5 3 Rather, courts
of equity recognize the derivative form of action because corporate directors are held to the standard of a trustee in fulfilling
their fiduciary duties to the corporation.The court concluded that
the policyholder "has an interest in the corporate funds, and a
right to compel proper management and the collection of assets
diverted, precisely as an ordinary stockholder has that right."54
This analysis, while cogent, remains incomplete for having skirted the debtor-creditor issue.
Thus, the Young court diverged from Swan in holding that
the statutory bar to private actions seeking orders, judgments, or
decrees that "interfere" with insurance companies was inapplicable to derivative actions. Courts in other jurisdictions, applying
similar statutes, subsequently held likewise.55 These rulings
signify that insurance commissioners possess a nonexclusive
power to police the industry. Acceptance of this proposition is
pivotal in any insurance policyholder derivative suit, yet it has
been virtually ignored in contemporary judicial opinions on the
subject. Moreover, neither the early nor the later cases adequately answer standing concerns raised by the creditor-like expectations of the mutual policyholder.

Young, 99 NYS at 455 (emphasis added).
See id (observing that directors and stockholders are not technically trustees).
Id at 455-56.
See, for example, Haynes, 34 F2d at 307-08; Winger v Chicago City Bank & Trust
Co., 394 111 94, 67 NE2d 265, 272 (1946).
52
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2. Modern case law.
Unlike the early opinions, modern cases do not provide even
partially satisfying analyses concerning policyholder standing to
sue derivatively. To the extent that courts consider standing,
they tend to assume it summarily and move on to other issues.
Modern treatment of policyholder standing begins with
Koster v (American)Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.56 Koster
is noteworthy for at least two reasons: first, it exemplifies judicial
conflation of policyholder and stockholder actions; second, it is
the only derivative suit by a mutual insurance policyholder to
reach the Supreme Court. At the outset of Koster, the district
court, despite the plaintiff's portrayal of the case as a stockholder
derivative suit,57 noted that "[t]he plaintiff is not a stockholder-he is a policyholder."58 The court concluded that the suit
involved the affairs of an out-of-state, or "foreign" corporation,59
and that that fact, coupled with issues of convenience to parties
and witnesses, warranted dismissal. 0 Thus, the lower court never directly resolved the implications of the plaintiff's policyholder
status.
In affirming the district court's dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court
acknowledged standing by implication. The Second Circuit noted
that while Illinois law on the subject of policyholder standing "is
not wholly clear[,] ...we see no valid distinction between a

stockholder's and a policyholder's derivative suit seeking relief of
this character."6 ' The Supreme Court, in turn, conflated the two
varieties of derivative action by cursory analogy: "The
stockholder's derivative action, to which this policyholder's action
is analogous, is an invention of equity.

,,.62

Koster is known as a forum non conveniens case. However,
had the trial court pushed its analysis one step further, the case
could have been dismissed on standing grounds. The district
court stated vaguely that Illinois's regulatory statutes allowed
only the director of insurance to bring certain actions affecting

'

64 F Supp 595 (ED NY 1945), aff'd, 153 F2d 888 (2d Cir 1946), aff'd, 330 US 518

(1947).
5, Id at 597.
' Id. Plaintiff Koster, a New York policyholder in an Illinois mutual insurance

company, alleged waste and self-dealing by Kemper, an officer of the company. Id at 596.
That is, chartered under the laws of a state other than the forum state.
Koster, 64 F Supp at 597-98.
', Koster, 153 F2d at 890.
', Koster, 330 US at 522.
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insurance companies and that "[tihis may be of importance in
view of the fact that the plaintiff has never communicated or
made any complaint to the Insurance Department of the State of
Illinois."63 Thus, although the appellate opinions in Koster flatly
declared the case analogous to a stockholder action, the district
court did consider insurance-specific state law issues, such as
whether demand on the director of insurance was required. Indeed, as the Second Circuit remarked in a footnote, the district
court in New York would not have declined jurisdiction but for
the fact that Koster was a policyholder, not a shareholder in a
stock corporation.64 It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that Koster
is cited as authority for the application of the doctrine
of forum
65
non conveniens to "a shareholder's derivative action."
Other policyholder derivative actions contemporaneous with
Koster expressly assumed standing but required demand on the
state insurance commissioner as a prerequisite to the maintenance of a private action.6 These holdings marked a departure
from the earlier cases holding that actions interfering with insurers must be brought by attorneys general (if at all), and this
seems for a time to have been the trend.
Koster presaged a tendency of courts to pass over standing by
cursory analogy to stockholder actions. The Illinois Appellate
Court displayed this tendency in Lower v Lanark Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. 7 The Lower court considered whether the plaintiff lost standing when the company declined to renew her policy
during the course of the litigation. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff "no longer had
standing to maintain the shareholder's derivative action."" In so
doing, the Lower court did not hesitate to substitute "shareholder" for "policyholder" in its discussion, did not inquire whether
the Illinois statute governing derivative actions permitted a poll-

Koster, 64 F Supp at 598.
Koster, 153 F2d at 890 n 2 ("[T]he New York courts would not have declined
jurisdiction had this been a derivative suit by a shareholder in a stock corporation.").
DeMott, ShareholderDerivativeActions § 4:11 at 83-85 (cited in note 10).
See, for example, Shay v MetropolitanLife Insurance Co., 172 Misc 202, 14 NYS2d
347, 348 (NY Sup Ct 1939) (holding that policyholder must have exhausted other remedies before maintaining a derivative action); Clifford v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
264 AD 168, 34 NYS2d 693, 696 (1942) (same).
151 I11 App 3d 471, 502 NE2d 838 (1986).
68 Id at 840.
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cyholder action,69 and did not discuss whether or how the
director's regulatory power might bear on the case.
In Elgin v Alfa Corp, a recent case involving facts similar to
Lower, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant directors
and officers, which purportedly had been entered on standing
grounds. 0 Elgin is notable because it relaxed the traditional
rule that a derivative plaintiff must be an equitable owner of the
company at the time suit is brought.7' The opinion's emphasis
on that procedural requirement, however, obscured the more
basic question of standing. The court relegated the question of
whether a policyholder ever has the legal capacity to bring a
derivative action to a terse footnote, stating that "[ilt is undisputed that a policyholder in a mutual company can bring a derivative action on behalf of the mutual company." 2 While "undisputed" may mean that the parties did not brief the issue,7" it is also
possible that, under the authorities cited, the court believed the
conclusion indisputable. This would be surprising both because
the issue had never before been considered in Alabama and because neither of the sources cited provide compelling authority

Id at 839-40. See 850 ILCS 5/7.80 (1993) (providing for a derivative action by a
shareholder who meets a contemporaneous ownership requirement, without specifying the
scope of the term "shareholder").
'0 598 S2d 807, 813 (Ala 1992). The Alabama Supreme Court excused Elgin from the
contemporaneous ownership requirement. The court stated that the Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure require "that the plaintiff allege that he was a 'shareholder or member at
the time of the transaction of which he complains'" and that this requirement "is referred
to as ... 'contemporaneous ownership' or 'substantive standing.'" Id at 811-12, citing Ala
R Civ P 23.1. The issue on appeal was whether the court should excuse the policyholderplaintiff from the contemporaneous ownership requirement because the company had
declined to renew his policy in order to deprive him of standing. The court held that,
although the plaintiff had no right to have the company renew his policy (and, hence, no
direct cause of action for reinstatement), the plaintiff would be equitably excused from the
contemporaneous ownership requirement because there was evidence that the company's
reason for refusing to renew Elgin's policy was to negate his standing. Elgin, 598 S2d at
813. Although the ownership-at-filing requirement was not mandated by Ala R Civ P 23.1,
it may have been pivotal in the decision. As the court stated, "lilt is of considerable import
to this determination that Elgin presented evidence that he was a policyholder with Alfa
Mutual at the time of the disputed transactions."Id.
", Compare Lower, 502 NE2d at 840 (stating that a shareholder must retain ownership throughout pendency of action).
Elgin, 598 S2d at 811 n 3, citing Pomerantz v Clark, 101 F Supp 341 (D Mass
1951), and 43 Am Jur 2d Insurance § 73 at 155 (1982). The Elgin opinion does not distinguish "substantive standing" qua contemporaneous ownership under Rule 23.1 from the
more basic issue of whether, assuming contemporaneous ownership and all other adjectival requirements are satisfied, a policyholder has the same capacity to sue as a stockholder. See id at 811-14.
7' See note 15 for reasons the parties may not have briefed the issue.
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for the asserted proposition.74 Elgin is thus flimsy precedent: the
opinion addresses neither the level and effectiveness of state
regulation nor the differences in the relationship between stock
and mutual companies and their members-issues that are vital

to the standing inquiry.'
C. The Statutory Framework for Mutual Insurance Derivative
Actions
1. Derivative actions by stockholders.
Professor DeMott, in her practice manual on derivative actions, cites thirty-six state laws providing for derivative actions
by "one or more shareholders." 6 In the remaining jurisdictions,
the regulation of derivative actions is left to the courts. Of the
states with substantive statutes, Connecticut provides a derivative cause of action to "shareholders or members" of corporations
generally,7 7 Wisconsin has a statute tailored to nonstock corporations,7" and Pennsylvania gives policyholders standing in certain circumstances.79 That Wisconsin's legislature passed a law
giving derivative standing to members of nonstock companies
twenty years after it gave stockholders a statutory cause of action8 0 implies that the stockholder provision did not extend be-

" The first source cited by the Elgin court was Pomerantz, 101 F Supp at 345
(Plaintiff's rights to bring a derivative action "are parallel to a shareholder's rights to
bring [such an] action.... [However,] [c]onceivably the laws ... that subject mutual
insurance companies to supervision and correction by the insurance commissioner reduce.., the right of a minority member to bring [a derivative] suit.... But this point
need not be decided.... ."). The second was 43 Am Jur 2d Insurance § 73 at 155 n 74
(cited in note 72), which cites Huber v Martin, 127 Wis 412, 105 NW 1031 (1906). Despite
Am Jur's reliance on it, Huber may not have been good law since 1953, when the Wisconsin legislature accorded a derivative cause of action to shareholders of business corporations, but did not address policyholders of mutual insurance companies. See Wis Stat Ann
§ 180.0741 (West 1992 & Supp 1995). See also note 80.
"' Other judicial opinions in policyholder actions have similarly failed to confront
these countervailing issues. See, for example, Stoner v Walsh, 772 F Supp 790, 795-96
(S D NY 1991) (assuming that general corporate law applies unless it conflicts with insurance law); Amabile v Lerner, 74 NJ Super 443, 181 A2d 520 (1962) (disposing of summary
judgment motions without even considering standing question).
' See DeMott, ShareholderDerivativeActions § 4:02 at 9-30 (cited in note 10).
"
Conn Gen Stat Ann § 52-572j(a) (West 1991 & Supp 1995).
78 Wis Stat Ann § 181.295 (West 1992 & Supp 1995).
"
40 Pa Stat § 506.1(r) (Purdon 1992 & Supp 1995) (establishing liability of insurance company officers and directors for losses occasioned by investments not authorized
by the act).
' See Wis Stat Ann §§ 180.0741, 181.295 (stock company and nonstock company
provisions respectively). George A. Hardy, Revisions of the Nonstock CorporationLaw, Wis
Bar Bull 21, 23 (June 1974) ("Section 13 establishes a statutory right in a member of a
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yond the stock corporation context; this may also be the case in
the thirty other states that provide for shareholder actions by
statute. Thus, the basis for a nonshareholder derivative suit in
these jurisdictions remains unclear.
The New York statutory scheme governing derivative suits is
more complete than most."' It also appears to contain a statutory bar to derivative actions on behalf of mutual insurers. While
the New York Business Corporation Law ("BCL") generally applies to insurance companies,82 § 108(d) of the New York Insurance Law ("Insurance Law") declares that certain articles and
sections of the BCL shall not apply to mutual insurance companies. This exclusion includes BCL Article Six, which contains §
626, the provision for shareholder derivative actions.'
That the New York legislature would amend its laws to deny
policyholders a statutory basis for derivative suits-when the
courts of that state have provided the richest vein of relevant
case law-invites inquiry. The legislature passed Insurance Law
§ 108 as part of a 1964 amendment that made the Insurance Law
independent of other corporate law chapters." Although § 108
states that BCL § 626 does not apply to mutual insurers (and
appears to override pre-1964 New York cases supporting policyholder derivative actions), subsequent cases suggest either that

[nonstock] corporation to bring a derivative action.") (emphasis added). One court, noting
that Tennessee's similar statutory scheme does not clearly apply to a nonstockholder
action, allowed the action to proceed under case precedents. Bourne v Williams, 633 SW2d
469, 472 (Tenn Ct App 1981).
" See Harry G. Henn and Jeffery H. Boyd, Statutory Trends in the Law of Nonprofit
Organizations: California, Here We Come!, 66 Cornell L Rev 1103, 1114-26, 1132-36
(1981).
' See NY Ins Law § 108(b)(1) (West 1985 & Supp 1996) ("If any provision of the
business corporation law conflicts with any provision of this chapter, the provision of this

chapter shall prevail, and the conflicting provision of the business corporation law shall
not apply.").
8' NY Ins Law § 108(d). BCL § 626(a) provides: "An action may be brought in the
right of a domestic or foreign corporation to procure a judgment in its favor, by a holder of
shares or of voting trust certificates of the corporation or of a beneficial interest in such
shares or certificates." NY Bus Corp Law § 626(a).
'

See New York State Legislative Annual, 1964 148:
[T]his amending bill adds ... a 'bridge section' between the Insurance Law and the
Business Corporation Law [now § 108].... However, certain provisions of the Busi-

ness Corporation Law are excluded from applicability to insurers ... as a continuation of the policy of this State in recognizing the specialized function of insurers, the
close regulation of the insurance industry by the Superintendent of Insurance and
the interest of the State in protecting the policyholders in this State.
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a policyholder may in fact sue in the face of § 108 or merely that
litigants have not pressed the issue."
The 1964 amendments make no provision for derivative
actions by the superintendent on behalf of solvent insurers. This
is significant because the remedies traditionally provided by the
superintendent are wholly different from the redress that derivative litigation seeks to provide. Whether this was a conscious
omission or resulted from inadvertence cannot be gleaned from
the legislative history, which generally suggests that exclusion of
BCL provisions from application to insurers was consistent with
state policy of "close regulation of the insurance industry by the
Superintendent of Insurance.""5 Nor does the legislative history
indicate whether the state interest in regulating insurance companies emanates solely from the public interest in being free
from primary harms caused by insurers, or whether it also derives from a policy of protecting mutual policyholders from management wrongdoing. New York's framework thus highlights the
division between legislative and judicial treatment of the standing issue and further calls into question the judicial habit of
assuming standing.
2. Actions by nonstockholders in other contexts.
Derivative actions by members of cooperatives and not-forprofit corporations and by limited partners provide instructive
points of reference, since courts entertaining these suits have
also relied on assumed standing, straight analogy to stockholder
actions, or, less commonly, statutory authority. 7
The mutual policyholder's predicament resembles that of a
member of a cooperative or a nonprofit corporation. Despite a
paucity of statutory authority, cooperative members generally
have been accorded derivative standing." One notable difference
' The question of whether courts should read NY Ins Law § 108(d) to disparage
policyholders' common law right to sue derivatively has not been litigated; indeed, §
108(d) appears never to have been cited in a case report. For policyholder actions filed in
New York since the passage of § 108, see Garfield v Equitable Life Assurance Society, 7
Mlisc 2d 283, 164 NYS2d 819 (NY Sup Ct 1956); Garfield v Equitable Life Assurance
Society, 205 NYS2d 758 (NY Sup Ct 1960). See also Stoner v Walsh, 772 F Supp 790, 805
(S D NY 1991) (discussing individual liability of board members of mutual company).
New York State Legislative Annual, 1964 at 148 (cited in note 84).
8' There have been numerous other special-context derivative suits. See, for example,
In re Sunrise Securities Litigation, 916 F2d 874 (3d Cir 1990) (depositors in mutual
savings and loan); York Properties,Inc. v Neidoff, 10 Misc 2d 439, 170 NYS2d 683 (NY
Sup Ct 1957) (pledgee of corporate stock); Kauffman v Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F2d 727
(3d Cir 1970) (shareholder in mutual fund).
' See, for example, Parishv Maryland and Virginia Milk ProducersAssociation, 250
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between cooperatives and mutual insurers, however, is that cooperatives enjoy a tradition of active management by members;89
this tradition renders derivative suits somewhat less suspect in
that context. Likewise, although few jurisdictions expressly authorize derivative actions by members of nonprofit organizations,
judges have occasionally let such suits proceed." Professor
DeMott concludes that this state of affairs is probably a result of
legislative inattention,9 ' since the states that have considered
the issue do permit derivative suits by members of nonprofit
corporations. Thus, malcontent cooperative members, nonprofit
members, and mutual policyholders all face inconsistent statutory authority for derivative standing, some recognition of such
standing in the case law, and (yet) inadequate policy analysis in
the pertinent judicial opinions.92
Limited partnership law concerning derivative actions is
more developed than the law in the cooperative, not-for-profit,
and insurance areas. Most notably, the recent versions of the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act provide a limited partner with standing to sue on behalf of the partnership if the general partners have refused or are unlikely to agree to bring the
action.9" This provision seems entirely appropriate in an era
when limited partnerships routinely control vast assets and include large numbers of investors well removed from, and without
personal knowledge of, the activities or even the identities of the
general partners.94 Significantly, this increase in size, and the
Md 24, 242 A2d 512, 555 (1968); O'Donnell v Sardegna, 336 Md 18, 646 A2d 398 (1994)
(standing assumed in dicta).
See note 23.
'o See, for example, Bourne v Williams, 633 SW2d 469, 472 (Tenn Ct App 1981)
(derivative action by member of residential property owners' association permissible,
notwithstanding that Tennessee corporate law only explicitly authorized suits by shareholders); Valle v North Jersey Automobile Club, 125 NJ Super 302, 310 A2d 518, 521
(1973) (holding that "shareholder" includes member of nonprofit corporation who brings a
derivative action); Atwell v Bide-A-Wee Home Association, 59 Misc 2d 321, 299 NYS2d 40,
41-42 (1969) (holding that a member of a membership corporation may maintain a derivative action against corporation so long as corporation is not excluded from the coverage of
Article Six of the General Corporation Law). See also Timothy P. Bjor and James Solheim,
13 Fletcher Cyc Corp § 5950 at 117 (Clark Boardman Callaghan Perm ed 1995) ("The
preconditions for a derivative proceeding may not be affected by the kind of corporation.").
"' DeMott, ShareholderDerivativeActions § 2:04 at 22 (cited in note 10). But see Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act § 6.30 (ABA 1988) (exposure draft) (granting
derivative standing for suits brought by 5 percent or fifty members).
" See, for example, Malone v Superior Court, 40 Cal 2d 546, 254 P2d 517, 519 (1953)
(action against officer of nonprofit corporation declared proper without elaboration).
' Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1976) with the 1985 Amendments, 6A
Uniform Laws Annotated § 1001 at 281 (West 1995).
" See DeMott, Shareholder DerivativeActions § 2:03 at 17-18 (cited in note 10). See
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widening gap between ownership and effective control, parallels
the experience of the larger mutual insurance companies in this
century.9 5 Indeed the gap between ownership and control may
even be wider in the mutual insurance context since policyholders tend to
take little or no interest in the financial health of the
9
company.

6

3. Actions by state regulators.
Enabling statutes are the sole source of an insurance
commissioner's power.9 7 The commissioner must perform his
duties in the manner authorized by statute and possesses no
independent authority to sanction the insurers he supervises."
Since insurance codes do not explicitly grant commissioners the
authority to sue derivatively, it follows that they may not properly do so, except when they exercise the broad powers explicitly
given to them to rehabilitate or wind up the affairs of insolvent
insurers.99 Consequently, commissioners appear unable to make
a damaged yet solvent insurer whole after a director's breach of
duty causes loss; this suggests the need for a derivative cause of
action for policyholders.
D. Rule 23.1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1"°° and similar state
also Comment, Standing of Limited Partners to Sue Derivatively, 65 Colum L Rev 1463,
1479-80 (1965) (Limited partners are similar to shareholders primarily because of separation of managers from investors.).
9' This issue is discussed further in Section III.
See text accompanying notes 24-26.
See Ronald A. Anderson and Mark S. Rhodes, 2A Couch on Insurance2d (Rev ed) §
21.4 at 230-31 (Law Co-op 2d ed 1984 & Supp 1995).
9 See Nationwide Life Insurance Co. v Superintendent of Insurance, 16 NY2d 237,
264 NYS2d 541, 545 (1965) ("In exercising the administrative powers of wide breadth
given to him, the Superintendent is required ... to follow the statute the way it
reads.... The statute is the charter of the Superintendent's authority."). See also People
u Albany & SusquehannaRailroad Co., 57 NY 161, 167 (1874) ("The people of this State
have no general power to invoke the action of the courts of justice, by suits in their name
of sovereignty for the redress of civil wrongs, sustained by some citizens at the hands of
others.").
See, for example, Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act, 13 Uniform Laws Annotated §
2 at 332 (West 1986 & Supp 1995) (providing that court must appoint commissioner as
receiver); NY Ins Law § 7402 (West 1985 & Supp 1996) (outlining circumstances in which
superintendent may act).
"®Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 provides:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a
right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or asso-
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rules are an important yet confusing part of the legal background
of derivative suits. Textually, the applicability of the Rule in the
mutual insurance context is problematic, yet judicial opinions
citing the Rule have failed to discuss whether it poses an obstacle
to nontraditional derivative plaintiffs.
The federal rule codifies common law safeguards that had
evolved in equity and were aimed at countering strike suits.''
Although Rule 23.1 is nominally a rule of procedure, Professor
DeMott notes a trend toward viewing the requirements of Rule
23.1 as regulations of substance, controlling who may sue, that
federal courts will apply in diversity actions so long as they are
not inconsistent with state law.0 2
Despite the ambiguity created by Rule 23.1, it is settled that
a plaintiff's capacity to sue is controlled by state law. 0 3 The
text of the Rule, which is set out in the margin above, plainly
presupposes a cause of action for at least some plaintiffs, and yet,
being a rule of procedure, it does not actually create one. Thus,
Rule 23.1 can govern the procedure followed in diversity cases
only where state law independently authorizes the actions. This
has spawned a measure of confusion in nonstockholder cases,
with the clearest examples occurring when judges evaluate a
derivative complaint under Rule 23.1 without first considering
whether a substantive cause of action exists.",
clation having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the
complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or
member at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains or that the
plaintiff's share or membership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by operation of
law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of
the United States which it would not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege
with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the
plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from
the shareholders or members, and his reasons for the plaintiff's failure to obtain the
action or for not making the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it
appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of
the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs.
See generally ALI, 2 Principlesof Corporate Governance § 7.02(a) at 33-34 & comment e at 39-40 (cited in note 27). The desirability of applying these and other statutory
safeguards specifically to a policyholder action is discussed in Section III.B.
102 DeMott, ShareholderDerivative Actions § 4:02 at 5 (cited in note
10).
'" See Kamen v Kemper FinancialServices, Inc., 500 US 90, 98-99 (1991) (indicating a
presumption of incorporation of state law); Galef v Alexander, 615 F2d 51, 58 (2d Cir
1980) (holding that in diversity suit, state law governs whether stockholder may bring derivative suit).
'1 See, for example, Chambrella v Rutledge, 69 Hawaii 271, 740 P2d 1008 (1987). In
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Although Rule 23.1 refers to "shareholders" and "members,"
the Rule's acknowledgment of standing seems limited to shareholders of corporations, on the one hand, or members of unincorporated associations, on the other. That is, the Rule does not
appear to contemplate actions by nonshareholder members of
incorporated entities, such as mutual policyholders and members
of not-for-profit corporations.' Rule 23.1 and state rules patterned on it have occasionally led courts to assume a cause of
action-apparently for any derivative plaintiff-and move quickly
to the Rule's requirements.0 5 Indeed, the Elgin case discussed
above0 7 is an example of a policyholder suit in which the court
treated a state rule patterned on Rule 23.1 as both providing and
procedurally regulating the derivative cause of action. The Elgin
court explicitly assumed policyholder standing, and compounded
its confusion by referring to the requirements of Rule 23.1 as
"threshold matter[s] of standing." 8 It can, at least, be argued
in mitigation that in Alabama and other states without statutes
covering derivative actions, a state rule patterned on Rule 23.1
may more reasonably be read to acknowledge a cause of action
for a nonshareholder member than may similar rules in states
where legislatures have entered the field. In the latter states,

that case, members of a not-for-profit corporation brought a purported derivative action,
alleging breach of duty to the corporation and seeking appointment of a receiver. The
Hawaii Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' cause of action was direct, but expressly
noted that the state's version of Rule 23.1, Hawaii R Civ P 23.1, would govern the case. Id
at 1014. The court did not mention that Hawaii's statutory provision for derivative actions
names only "shareholders," and not "members," as proper plaintiffs. See Hawaii Rev Stat
§ 415-49 (1985). The court's view, stated obliquely in a footnote, was that "[a] non-profit
corporation, of course, has no shareholders.... [b]ut there is no doubt that the principles
expressed here apply to members of non-profit corporations." Chambrella, 740 P2d at
1015 n 8 (emphasis added). This is remarkable in light of authoritative commentary
stating that members of nonprofit corporations lack derivative standing. See DeMott,
ShareholderDerivativeActions § 2:04 at 22 (cited in note 10) (noting that most states do
not permit member derivative suits).
o See, for example, Paul P. Harbrecht, The Contemporaneous Ownership Rule in
Shareholders'Derivative Suits, 25 UCLA L Rev 1041, 1041 n 2 (1978) (positing that,
"[s~trictly read, the Rule only requires an averment of contemporaneous ownership... [and] operates to bar suits by non-contemporaneous owners"). This strict view
suggests that where courts treat Rule 23.1 as providing a substantive cause of action, see,
for example, Elgin, 598 S2d at 811-12, the Rule could reasonably bar plaintiffs who are
neither shareholders in corporations nor members of unincorporated associations from
suing derivatively.
"1 See, for example, In re Sunrise Securities Litigation, 916 F2d 874, 887 (3d Cir
1990) (allowing derivative suit by former depositors of savings and loan following unsuccessful demand on receiver).
207 See text accompanying notes 70-75.
"a 598 S2d at 810-12.
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though, Rule 23.1 may tempt judges to skip standing and move
on to the Rule's procedural checklist-a problematic leap in any
instance where the substantive statute does not expressly provide
a cause of action to the instant plaintiff. The Rule may thus
exacerbate the tendency of courts to accord standing to nontraditional derivative plaintiffs by facile analogy to more familiar and
accepted stockholder actions.

III. A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
POLICYHOLDER DERIVATIVE STANDING

A. The Importance of Policyholder Standing
1. Current state regulation may not adequately protect
policyholders' interests.
The level of state regulation of insurers is an important
factor in evaluating policyholder standing because arguments can
be made that the commissioners' authority to remove officers and
directors will, if exercised diligently, protect policyholders from at
least ongoing management misconduct. Proponents of an administrative remedy will contend that it is less imperfect a check on
management than derivative litigation is likely to be, principally
because administrative oversight does not yield strike suits. Also,
a single administrative procedure is more efficient than the multiple derivative actions that commonly follow corporate scandals.
Thus, the argument goes, administrative oversight conserves
judicial resources. Indeed, a well supported and diligent commissioner can use his enumerated powers to prod a company to sue
or otherwise to seek a remedy from an officer or director whose
breach of duty has harmed the company. There are, however, a
number of good reasons to believe that a regime that relies solely
on administrative enforcement will underprotect the interests of
policyholders and perhaps even cost more than private enforcement.
First, the cost of private enforcement may be lower than the
cost of administrative adjudication when measured as cost per
dollar collected by the enforcer. This is because private enforcement involves profit-maximizing behavior by plaintiffs' attorneys.
The plaintiffs' bar will expend resources to investigate wrongdoing and sue for redress up until the point where marginal cost
equals marginal return. Administrative agencies, understaffed
and constrained by budgetary considerations, cannot find the
most efficient enforcement level in this way. Thus private en-
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forcement via derivative actions should be a better remedy so
long as the added "deadweight" social costs-stemming mainly
from strike suits and trial costs-do not exceed the costs saved by
reducing administrative enforcement." 9 Even if the costs of a
private enforcement regime exactly equal the costs of an equivalent level of administrative enforcement, the former is preferable
for the simple reason that derivative suit settlements are paid
out of private funds (aggregate premiums that directors and
officers voluntarily pay for liability insurance) whereas the costs
of bureaucratic oversight of insurance management are borne by
taxpayers. Thus all taxpayers, with the exception of mutual insurance executives, should favor private enforcement if marginal
costs are roughly equal.
Second, even if administrative protection from ongoing (as
opposed to past) harms were adequate, expert and well staffed
insurance departments, capable of closely observing the activities
of all insurers in the state, are becoming increasingly difficult to
find. There has long been evidence of understaffing and inadequate resources in state insurance departments, despite
ostensibly thorough regulation."0 Indeed, in the current political climate, even the most effective state insurance departments
will face intense pressure to cut budgets. Moreover, state insurance regulators may be susceptible to lobbying by insurance and
other political interests that may not be consonant with the interests of policyholders. Private attorneys general, and plaintiffs
generally, are not subject to such influences."'
Third, in addition to social cost, private enforcement provides
a more just distribution of costs. The statutory arrows in a
commissioner's quiver, such as the powers to impose fines, remove directors, seek injunctions, and revoke the company's license, do not remedy losses on a company's balance sheet after
damage has been done. Indeed, when an insurance commissioner
" See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4
J Legal Stud 1, 36-38 (1975).
" See Keeton and Widiss, Insurance Law § 8.1(b) at 935 (cited in note 20) (noting
that "state insurance departments have continually been hampered by inadequate funding ...and inefficient personnel"); Woolley and DeGeorge, Policies of Deception?, Bus
Week at 25 (cited in note 1) ("[Sltates can rarely muster the resources needed for extensive investigations.").
.. For more on the advantages and disadvantages of private enforcement, see Landes
and Posner, 4 J Legal Stud 1 (cited in note 109); Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler,
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensationof Enforcers, 3 J Legal Stud 1 (1974);
A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J Legal Stud 105
(1980).
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fines a mutual company, the resultant payout is a further loss to
the company that its members must absorb. Even if a commissioner may be said to have implied authority to sue derivatively
on behalf of a mutual insurer-and thereby make it whole-there
is no reported case in which a commissioner has done so.
Fourth, there is an externality problem associated with relying on in-state enforcement of the rights of geographically dispersed policyholders. Even when director and officer misconduct
violates the laws of the home state, the interests of most company policyholders are likely outside the cognizance of that state's
commissioner or any foreign commissioner. That is, in all but the
smallest mutuals, only a small fraction of the company's policyholders live in the home state or any other single state. Where
the harm to in-state customers is slight relative to that of out-ofstate policyholders, a busy commissioner may elect not to vindicate the rights of the former. Here again, losses to the company
will likely go unremedied.
While insurance commissioners can act collectively through
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") to
reach settlements for multistate insurer malfeasance, such coordinated action is a new concept and appears ad hoc." Furthermore, like the commissioners who compose it, the NAIC seeks
not to ensure compensation for insurers financially harmed by
directors' breaches of duty, but rather to ensure that restitution
is made to members of the public suffering "primary" harms,
such as losses due to insurance agents' use of deceptive sales
techniques."
A final problem with administrative enforcement is the lack
of express authority for commissioner derivative actions. New
York exemplifies this problem. The legislative history of New
York's Insurance Law § 108 suggests that the protection of instate policyholders was a factor in the decision to bar standing
for mutual insurance policyholders." 4 If meaningful "protection"
is the goal, however, the state should allow either the policyholders or the superintendent to sue derivatively to redress harms
suffered by mutual insurers at the hands of directors and officers.

See Prudentialin Talks on Accusations, NY Times Section 1 at 36 (cited in note 4)
(Metropolitan Life investigation was the first sales investigation coordinated nationwide
by state regulators.).
1
See, for example, id (reporting that task force of state regulators procured agreement from Met Life to refund $76 million).
.. For a discussion of New York's interest in protecting state policyholders, see note
1
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Yet, facially, it appears that neither may do so under the present
scheme. The current regime thus underprotects the interests of
both policyholders and the company itself.
In light of these considerations, it makes little sense for
courts to require policyholder demand upon the state insurance
commissioner as a precondition to maintenance of a derivative
suit. That courts have done so in the past" 5 indicates a need for
legislative or judicial clarification of this aspect of the standing
issue. Where insurance codes authorize commissioners' derivative
suits on behalf of insolvent companies, a clear indication whether
such authorization extends to actions against solvent companies
would eliminate litigants' uncertainty.
2. Mutual policyholders exercise only limited control.
While the process of proxy solicitation and voting gives stockholders an avenue for redress against wayward management, it
is an avenue that policyholders can rarely (if ever) effectively use.
As Professors Keeton and Widiss have noted, "the wide dispersion of 'ownership' interests in mutual insurers typically creates
a situation of substantial independence for the management[,]... [which] creates a greater risk that management will
go unchecked."" 6 This gulf between ownership and control is
widened by the fact that, although mutual policyholders are entitled to vote in the election of directors, they rarely do so in meaningful numbers." Nor are there "majority" or "principal" policyholders whose voices are loud enough to constitute a check on
management."' Moreover, unlike shareholders of publicly traded companies, policyholders cannot liquidate their interests if
management is harming the company. Thus policyholders-whose interests are not marketable-need the protection of
derivative actions even more than do owners with market outs.
Similar to the proxy and marketability issues, the limited
partnership analogy supports standing for policyholders. First,
mutual insurance companies, like limited partnerships, are statutorily created and members derive rights in the first instance

...See text accompanying notes 48-50.
.. Keeton and Widiss, InsuranceLaw § 8.5(c) at 968-69 (cited in note 20).
.. See, for example, Pomerantz v Clark, 101 F Supp 341, 345 (D Mass 1951) ("[Flew
policyholders know their voting rights or attend meetings or sign proxies."). See also
Hetherington, 1969 Wis L Rev at 1079 (cited in note 23) (noting that only 593 of more
than 18 million Prudential Life policyholders voted in the 1968 company elections).
118 See Hetherington, 1969 Wis L Rev at 1081 (cited in note 23) (noting a general rule
that each policyholder has one vote regardless of the number or value of policies held).

1996]

Derivative Actions by Policyholders

1089

from statute. Second, mutual insurers and limited partnerships
manage immense assets and separate ownership from management and control. Third, the ultimate owners of both types of
organizations are scattered far and wide. These characteristics in
the limited partnership realm moved the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to allow limited partner derivative suits." Because policyholders share these same characteristics, they should likewise be permitted to sue derivatively.
3. Debtor-creditor
obstacle to standing.

precepts are not an insurmountable

The force of these practical arguments in favor of policyholder standing is limited by the policyholders' creditor-like expectations in buying the company's product. Policyholders do not take
out insurance policies to realize "dividends" or augmented "share"
value when the company grows. Rather, policyholders buy insurance expecting that the company will compensate them when
contractually specified events occur. These expectations parallel
those of creditors, or, more precisely, "buyer[s] of protection,"'
rather than those of investors. This attenuates policyholders'
ownership interest and reduces their interest in monitoring and
constraining management.'" That is, the creditor-like interest
in receiving a payment following a misfortune can and often will
diverge from the long-term interests of the company, rendering
the motives behind a derivative action by such a (creditor-like)
party somewhat suspect.
To see how policyholders' interests might diverge from those
of the company, consider a mutual company that invests in derivative securities as part of its strategy to maximize the long-term
return on its capital. A policyholder whose policy covers shortterm risks only (such as the risk that a beach house will be damaged by a hurricane) will fear that market risks associated with
derivative securities are jeopardizing the company's ability to pay
claims near term; such a policyholder may attempt to sue
derivatively on those grounds.2 In the hard case, the nearterm risks will be substantial, rendering the applicability of the busi-

11

See text accompanying note 93.

,2 Hetherington, 1969 Wis L Rev at 1077 (cited in note 23).
121

Id (arguing that the policyholder "owns nothing but the right to performance by the

insurer of its contractual obligation").
' Such a suit might seek an injunction or, more likely, damages after an adverse
movement in the value of the derivative security.
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ness judgment rule uncertain." If the investment strategy is,
nevertheless, in the company's long-term interest (as viewed by
management and policyholders, such as whole life policyholders,
insuring long-term risks), the company's interests are not aligned
with those of the plaintiff policyholder (who cares only that the
company remain solvent until next year).
This line of argument, however, need not preclude policyholder derivative suits. It is possible to protect policyholders
without sapping judicial resources or encouraging frivolous litigation. The best solution is to specify a minimum number of policyholders who, collectively, represent an ownership interest large
enough to justify standing without doing violence to the traditional rule that a creditor may not sue derivatively on behalf of a
solvent company.'2 4
The creditor analogy is either true and justified in its application to policyholders or it is a formalistic proxy for the real
complaint-that derivative litigation is fraught with defects and
should be limited where there is an alternative means of checking management misconduct. Specifying a minimum number of
policyholder-plaintiffs solves both the formalistic and the defectdriven concerns.' First, above a certain numerical threshold, a
group of policyholders must be considered owners for the purposes of controversies with management. While each policyholder
has a tiny ownership stake, there are no other owners available
to pursue the ownership interests against management (as there
might be in a corporation with a more complex capital structure).
To argue that policyholders may not sue in groups as owners
runs counter to the idea that real persons must be the ultimate
owners of corporate property. 6
Second, requiring a minimum number of policyholder-plaintiffs overcomes the primary defects of derivative litigation by
requiring that plaintiffs' attorneys contact a sizeable number of
individuals and convince them that a given complaint against

"' The business judgment rule insulates good faith management decisions from the
interference of derivative actions. See generally Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander,
Laws of Corporations and Other Business Enterprises § 366 at 1070-73 (West 1983). This
example assumes the risks to be such as may cause a judge to balk in applying the rule to
an insurance company.
1
This issue is addressed further in Section III.C.
,, For an example of such a threshold, see Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act §
6.30 (cited in note 91) (allowing derivative action by any member or group of members
owning 5 percent or more of the voting stock, or any group of fifty or more members).
126 For a discussion of the policyholders' ownership interests, see text accompanying
note 52.
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management is legitimate. This presents a cost threshold below
which no suit will be brought; plaintiffs' lawyers will only invest
resources to meet the threshold where the value of the suit is
substantially above it (thus presenting a profit opportunity for
them). Because the value of the suit (how much was lost) is distinct from the merit of its allegations (whether management
wrongfully caused the loss), it is still possible that high-value
suits of low merit will be filed. But the up-front cost should lead
potential plaintiffs to fear the possibility of losing at the summary judgment stage (and losing the time and money invested), a
possibility that will in turn diminish the expected value of any
anticipated settlement enough to cause them to shy away in the
first instance. Simply put, strike suits-driven by the desire for
quick, nuisance-value settlements-will be discouraged by the
up-front costs of bringing suit.' Thus, such a regime permits
the owners of mutual companies to benefit from the services of
the plaintiffs' bar, including active (yet cost-efficient) enforcement
of management duties and the deterrence of future breaches that
results from such enforcement, while also providing a
disincentive to strike suits.
Although this proposal offers the best way to regulate the
actions of mutual insurance managers and directors, two further
problems must be addressed: first, the legal grounding for this
cause of action, and, second, a mechanism by which the courts
can discourage and deal with frivolous litigation.
B. Legal Bases for Policyholder Derivative Actions
Aside from the form of the derivative suit, the question remains whether plaintiffs may sue at all in the absence of an
express state statutory provision. Legislative clarification of this
issue would relieve judges of the task of twisting corporate statutes-which in terms give standing to shareholders only-in
order to apply them to nonshareholder actions. 8 Indeed, if legislators view provisions for derivative actions by policyholders as

' One side effect is that low-value suits of high merit will also be discouraged. A
ready solution to this problem would be to exempt from the minimum-joined-parties requirement actions where the amount in controversy is low.
' See, for example, Bourne v Williams, 633 SW2d 469, 472 (Tenn App 1981). In
Bourne, the court applied Tenn Code Ann §§ 48-718, which grants a derivative cause of
action to "shareholders," to an action by a member of a nonprofit corporation. The court
stated that "[w]hile this Court would prefer that specific statutory authority be spelled out
more clearly, nonetheless, it is not without adequate precedent to see to it that the
plaintiffs at least have their day in court." Bourne, 633 SW2d at 472.
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out of place in chapters relating to business corporation law, 9
it is doubly ironic that courts have been called upon to contort
sections of corporation codes in order to let nonshareholder suits
proceed.
When presented with policyholder derivative actions, courts
should unambiguously decide that plaintiffs do or do not have a
derivative right of action as members of the company-even if
the parties do not press the issue on the court. This will require
insurance-specific analysis of current statutes and an explication
of the defects of the existing judicial opinions on the subject.
Certainly, legislative clarification would be preferable in all jurisdictions where the legislature has entered the field, Wisconsin
and Connecticut excepted.3 0 But until such clarification occurs,
and in states where the courts alone regulate derivative suits,
judges should examine the similarities and differences between
stockholders and policyholders (as well as related questions) and
conclude that policyholders, if acting in sufficient numbers, are
entitled to sue derivatively for the same reasons that other equity owners are allowed to do so.
C. Necessary Safeguards Must be Adapted from Corporation
Law
Minority shareholder suits have long been controversial, and
derivative suits provide no guarantee that the proceeds will flow
to the shareholders. Indeed, plaintiffs' lawyers are often the real
parties in interest. Derivative suits rarely get past the demand
requirement and, when they do, they do not always set matters
right on the company balance sheet.' These and other short-

129

See, for example, Consultant's Report to State of New York, Joint Legislative

Committee to Study Revision of Corporation Laws 30 (1963) (on file with U Chi L Rev)
("Recommendation (c)(i) of this Report is that references in Section 63 [providing for reimbursement of litigation expenses of corporate officials].., to non-stock corporations,
savings banks and mutual insurance companies, be omitted in the proposed section. Since
the proposed section is to be part of the Business Corporation Act, inclusion of the stated
references would be out of place."). But see New York State Legislative Annual, 1964 at

148 (cited in note 84) (applying parts of the BCL to insurers).
See notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
," See, for example, ALI, 2 Principles of Corporate Governance pt VII, ch 1 at 10
(cited in note 27) (Empirical data suggests existence of a substantial conflict of interest in
derivative litigation between plaintiffs' attorneys and their ostensible clients, the shareholders, which causes a high incidence of derivative action settlements involving minor
procedural changes but significant attorney fees.); Bryant G. Garth, Ilene H. Nagel, and
Sheldon J. Plager, Empirical Research and the Shareholder Derivative Suit: Toward a
Better-Informed Debate, 48 L & Contemp Probs 137, 145-47 (Summer 1985).
1
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comings of derivative litigation have long been recognized and
have received ample attention from commentators." 2 Still, the
policies that support minority shareholder derivative actions
have prevailed over the risks and defects of derivative litigation,
making derivative suits an accepted means of policing the conduct of corporate management.
In the past half century or so, as the perils of derivative
litigation have become clear,'33 legislatures have adopted security-for-expenses statutes and other safeguards to ensure the
bona fides of derivative plaintiffs. Beyond these mechanisms,
state legislatures and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have tightened common law strictures." Rule 23.1 lists these strictures, ' a number of which existed prior to the promulgation of
the Federal Rules. This Section addresses the Rule's requirements seriatim, discussing their applicability in the mutual insurance setting.
While policyholders may sue derivatively in certain jurisdictions, these jurisdictions may not have safeguards specially tailored to such suits. Moreover, courts may be unable to apply
existing statutory safeguards because, by their terms, they apply
only to stockholder suits. For example, once standing is accorded
(or assumed), stockholder plaintiffs may be required to post security for expenses, including attorneys' fees. Nineteen states have
statutes imposing such a requirement, with the amount of security generally left to the discretion of the court.' 6 With some exceptions, these statutes apply only if a plaintiff's holdings of the
company's stock fall below a certain level."' These statutes,
however, and the general security-for-costs statutes in force in forty-

"' See, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as
Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 L & Contemp Probs 5 (Summer 1985); Roberta
Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J L Econ & Org 55
(1991).
"' For example, empirical findings have indicated that (1) plaintiffs' holdings tend to
be nominal, (2) litigated victories are seldom achieved, and (3) private settlements in
which the corporation receives nothing are common. Franklin S. Wood, Survey and Report
RegardingStockholders' Derivative Suits 112-15 (NY Chamber of Commerce 1944). See
also ALI, 2 Principlesof CorporateGovernance pt VII, ch 1 at 10 (cited in note 27).
'"' See ALI, 2 Principlesof Corporate Governance pt VII, ch 1 at 9 (cited in note 27)
(noting that state legislatures tightened common law defenses).
"
See note 100.
138 See DeMott, ShareholderDerivative Actions § 3:01 at 1 (cited in note 10).
Most of these statutes are patterned after the Model Business Corporation Act Ann
2d § 49 (West 1971) (providing that the corporation may require a plaintiff holding less
than 5 percent of outstanding shares, or less than $25,000 in value, to post security for
costs likely to be incurred during the course of litigation, including attorneys' fees).
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one states,' are available only against specified stockholderplaintiffs. Because policyholders are not stockholders, courts have
declined
to compel policyholders suing derivatively to post secu13 9
rity.
The absence of provisions for security-for-expense deposits in
policyholder derivative actions might be addressed in two ways.
The first option is a statute. Wisconsin's 1973 law, currently
unique, provides that defendants may require derivative plaintiffs to post security if they account for less than 3 percent of the
members of a nonstock company."4 This provision, however,
sets the threshold too high. While there should be a level above
which a group of policyholders suing derivatively should be free
from security-for-costs requirements, a derivative action by 3
percent of the policyholders in any but the smallest mutual companies will be rare, since never do more than a fraction of a percent participate in company affairs.' Thus a lower threshold,
perhaps a fixed number of one hundred or so policyholder-plaintiffs, seems proper. If this level is too strict (for example, in cases
involving very small mutual insurance companies), a judge
should be able to waive the security requirement for belowthreshold plaintiffs in cases where the cause of action appears
meritorious. The second way the security-for-expense problem
might be addressed in the policyholder suit context is via the
creation or modification of court rules" giving judges the discretion to require a plaintiff to post security when they deem it
appropriate.
With some modification, courts can and should apply the
requirements of Rule 23.1 to policyholder derivative actions.
Requiring that the complaint be verified,' for example, has a

" DeMott, ShareholderDerivativeActions § 3:03 at 29-30 n 1 (cited in note 10) (citing
state statutes).
"' See, for example, Imberman v Alexander, 203 Misc 576, 116 NYS2d 609, 610-11
(NY Sup Ct 1952) (In mutual insurance derivative action, defendant could not compel
plaintiff to post security for expenses under statute requiring security only from shareholders or holders of voting trust certificates.).
'- Wis Stat Ann § 181.295(4). For the Wisconsin statutes establishing the cause of action, see note 80. For a more absolute threshold, see NY Not-for-Profit Corp Law § 623(a)
(McKinney 1970 & Supp 1996) (providing that plaintiffs may bring a derivative action only if they represent 5 percent or more of the holders of the corporation's capital certificates).
1
See notes 117 and 146.
4 See DeMott, ShareholderDerivativeActions § 3:03 at 38-40 n 24 (cited in note 10)
(citing local federal court rules governing security for costs).
"3 When a derivative complaint is verified, the attorney of record swears that he has
made a good faith investigation of the allegations in the complaint and that the allega-
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prophylactic effect against strike suits since it requires some
level of prescreening by the plaintiffs' attorneys.'
In addition, courts should require contemporaneous ownership as a prerequisite to derivative standing, despite conflicting
case law concerning whether a company may defeat standing by
canceling a plaintiff's policy." The terms of the insurance contract govern the policyholder relationship in the first instance,
and courts should be wary of holding that an insurer may not
trump standing by exercising its right not to renew in these circumstances. Moreover, a strict ownership-at-filing requirement
would provide a useful bright line, albeit at the risk of shutting
out plaintiffs whose policies happen to expire during the process
of making demand, just prior to filing a complaint.
The requirement of Rule 23.1 that the derivative plaintiff
attempt a demand on the members when the board refuses to
bring the action (or give reasons for not making the effort) should
not apply to policyholder actions. Judges should, as a matter of
course, exercise the discretion Rule 23.1 gives them to excuse
such a demand, even if plaintiffs fail to make clear their reasons
for not making it. As noted earlier, insurance policyholders generally do not receive or respond to proxy statements and do not
otherwise participate in the voting process. 4 ' Thus, for courts
to require that a demand be made on all policyholders will, in
most cases, be unreasonable because the costs of communication
will virtually always be prohibitive. 47
This is not to say that courts should not require policyholders to win a certain number of their kind over to the cause. To
the contrary, policyholders' attenuated ownership interests militate in favor of requiring that some number of them be joined as
plaintiffs. As noted with reference to the security-for-expenses
issue, requiring a number on the order of one hundred policytions are true on information and belief.
'" See Edmund C. Ursin, Note, Verification as a Safeguard Against Abuse of
Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 18 Stan L Rev 1221, 1222-23 (1966) (discussing impact of
verification requirement on strike suits).
'" Compare Elgin, 598 S2d at 813 (Ex-policyholder may be equitably excused from
ownership-at-filing requirement.), with Lower, 502 NE2d at 840 (Insurer may defeat
standing to sue derivatively by not renewing plaintiff's policy.). See text accompanying
notes 67-72.
"' See Hetherington, 1969 Wis L Rev at 1079 (cited in note 23) ("[P]olicyholder
participation is minimal, and the [voting] procedure has far less... significance than it
does in a widely held stock corporation.").
", See, for example, Elgin, 598 S2d at 817 ("Even one written formal demand by mail
upon more than 373,000 mutual company policyholders would have been prohibitively
expensive and time-consuming.").
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holder-plaintiffs will deter strike suits without imposing .communication costs that may foreclose the remedy. While any number arrived at without extensive empirical research must be considered tentative, it seems reasonable to assume that one hundred policyholders will not support a strike suit.' Furthermore, the collective interest of one hundred policyholders seems
sufficient to overcome concerns as to each individual
policyholder's attenuated stake in the outcome of the controversy.
Finally, Rule 23.1's requirements of fair and adequate representation and of judicial approval of settlements are entirely
appropriate in the mutual insurance setting. The uncertainty
associated with the standing question creates a risk of collusive
settlements that is greater than in the stock-corporation context.
Defendant directors and officers will be inclined to settle for
strike suit money rather than risk judicial recognition of policyholder standing. Mandatory judicial approval of such settlements coupled with diligent evaluation of settlement proposals
ought to weed out those strike suits that get past the minimumjoined-plaintiffs and "fair and adequate representation" hurdles.
CONCLUSION

Two major policies favor derivative suits: the concept of private attorneys general and the right to compel proper use of
corporate assets. These policies apply as strongly in the mutual
insurance setting as they do in the business corporation context.
Judges and legislatures must consider whether the policyholders'
attenuated ownership interest should, in view of state regulation
and the well known risks of derivative litigation, tip the balance
against policyholders.
As this Comment has argued, private policyholder enforcement probably surpasses state regulation in terms of efficiency
and efficacy. A requirement that policyholders bring derivative
actions in substantial groups permits the owners of these companies to harness the energy of the plaintiffs' bar while tempering
its negative tendencies. Because numerous policyholders provide
a tangible equity interest, the plaintiffs' interests are more likely
to be aligned with the entire body of members. Such a group
action requirement, when coupled with insurance-specific adaptations of procedural safeguards developed in the corporate context,
would support policyholder standing and allay concerns as to

'

Over time, experience may point to a higher or lower number.
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strike suits. Moreover, it would not run afoul of the policies animating the rule against creditor derivative suits.
The status quo systematically underprotects policyholders.
Members do not meaningfully govern mutual insurance companies. Insurance commissioners lack authority to bring derivative
suits on behalf of solvent companies. State insurance departments are too inefficient and underfinanced to regulate effectively. Until one or more of these factors changes substantially to
better protect policyholders' interests, courts should explicitly
recognize and carefully regulate derivative actions in the mutual
insurance context.

